Datum
: 07. November 1998, ca. 11:15 Uhr
Ort
: Within 1.5 m South of extended centreline of Runway 10 at Dublin Airport, 7-8 miles from the threshold.
Unternehmen
1 : Air Luxor , Portugal
Flugzeugmuster1
: Lockheed L-1011 -500 TriStar, CS-TEB
Callsign
: LXR 3361
Unternehmen
2 : US Air Force
Flugzeugmuster2
: Learjet LJ35, 40085 (Military)
Callsign
: Reno 13
Learjet
LJ35, 40085 (Military)
Synopsis
The
military trainer, a Learjet LJ35, was engaged in VOR/DME approach training
to Runway 11, at Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel, which is a military aerodrome
10 miles south-west of Runway 10 at Dublin Airport. At the same time the
L1011 aircraft, approaching from the South, was being radar vectored on
to the localiser of Runway 10 at Dublin Airport. Whilst the L1011 was at
2500 ft, on the localiser, between 7-8 miles from touchdown, the military
trainer was on a northerly heading at 2100 ft, and came within 1.5 miles,
and 400 ft of the L1011 aircraft.
History
of the Civil Flight
At
10.57.11 hours, the aircraft, callsign Luxor 3361,was requested by Dublin
Control Centre (ACC) to decend to FL 70 and was cleared to the Dublin VOR.
The Runway in use at Dublin Airport was RYW 16. Luxor 3361 requested Runway
10 or Runway 28 for landing. Runway 10 was offered and accepted.
At
11.00.52 hours, Luxor 3361, approximately 25 NM south of Dublin Airport,
was instructed by ATC to descend to FL 60 on a heading of 360 degrees.
At the same time, the crew of the aircraft were advised that there was
military activity in the area underneath them, west of Casement Aerodrome,
and that they would be vectored for an ILS approach to Runway 10. Control
was then handed over to Dublin Approach Radar (APP).
At
11.07 hours, Luxor 3361, at an airspeed of 250 kts and a height of 4,000
ft., was instructed by Dublin Approach Radar to descend to 3,000 ft., to
turn on to a heading of 070º and to establish on the localiser for
Runway 10.
At
11.11.08 hours, whilst established on the localiser the crew were instructed
to maintain 3,000 ft., because of the proximity of a military aircraft.
Twenty-two seconds later the crew reported that they had the other aircraft
in sight. At 11.11.37 hours Luxor 3361 was cleared to continue the approach
to Runway 10.
History
of the Military Flight
The
American Air Force Learjet Trainer, based at Ramstein, Germany, made a
weekend training visit to Casement Aerodrome. On 7th. November 1998, the
crew took the opportunity to carry out some IFR training at the military
aerodrome. This involved the execution of VOR/DME approach training based
on the Air Corps published VOR/DME procedures for Runway 11.
Prior
to the military training flight the Captain was briefed on the military
airspace area at the control tower, Casement Aerodrome, by the military
air traffic controller on duty. His attention was drawn to the proximity
of Dublin Airport and Weston Aerodrome to the military aerodrome.
An
ICAO aeronautical chart of Ireland (Scale 1:500,000) was used for this
briefing. The captain indicated that he already had a VOR/DME chart for
Runway 11 and did not require a briefing on the approach procedure. The
briefing took approximately 10 minutes.
The
aircraft, callsign Reno 13, took off from Runway 23 at 10.49 hours, and
continued on a South-westerly heading. The Captain indicated that he wanted
to do some general handling in the area. The military controller then passed
him over to the Dublin Control Centre. After a few minutes the Captain
indicated that he was ready to do VOR/DME approach training, and was passed
back to the military controller at Casement Aerodrome. The military controller
did not have access to a radar facility at the time and requested Dublin
Control Centre to observe the aircraft whilst it carried out the approach.
During
the aircraft's first approach it appeared to the military controller that
the aircraft did not come to the overhead position to commence the approach,
but commenced at the intermediate fix (IF), and descended from 5,000 ft.,
to the missed approach point. The military controller then read out the
procedure over the R/T as the captain commenced his go-around. The military
controller then asked the Dublin Control Centre if they were happy with
the aircraft flight path as conducted. Dublin confirmed that they were
happy with the approach. The captain then informed the military controller
that the same approach procedure would be repeated again. The military
controller then cleared Reno 13 to conduct a second VOR/DME approach.
On
the second approach, the aircraft commenced a go-around at the missed approach
point and the crew were told, after they requested to climb, not to climb
above 2,000 ft., until advised to do so. The crew then asked were they
allowed to climb when they crossed the 345 radial from the Baldonnel VOR.
The controller replied that once they reached the 345 radial, they were
cleared to climb, but not before. The military controller then requested
that the crew report when the aircraft was established outbound on the
292 radial from Baldonnel VOR.
Meanwhile
the controller at Dublin Radar had noticed that Reno 13 had turned left
out of Baldonnel VOR, as required, but had exited the R16 military zone
and was tracking on a heading of approximately 345º at an altitude
of 2,000 ft.
At
11.10.56 hours, the controller requested military ATC, through land line,
to instruct the aircraft to turn on an immediate westerly heading. At 11.11.03
hours military ATC requested Reno 13 to turn "immediately westerly heading".
This request was acknowledged and Reno 13 turned on an approximate heading
of 270º. At this stage communication with Reno 13 was handed over
to Dublin Radar.
During
this turn, the altitude of the aircraft was recorded as 2100 ft., and the
time was 11.11.40 hours. At that time the position of the Learjet aircraft
was recorded as being within 1.5nm from the extended centreline of Runway10
at Dublin Airport, and approximately 7 miles from its touchdown point.
At the same time LXR 3361 was on Runway 10 localiser at a height of 2,500
ft at the same distance from touchdown and within 1.5nm north of Reno 13.
Reno
13 was then informed by Dublin Radar that the aircraft had come very close
to the Dublin localiser and had passed within 1.5 miles of traffic on final
approach to Runway 10 at Dublin Airport. The military aircraft then returned
for a full stop landing at Casement Aerodrome.
On
landing at Casement Aerodrome, the Captain of the military trainer indicated
that he had been flying the approach in a simulated single engine configuration.
He subsequently reported that after initially coming to a heading of 270º
at 2,000 ft., MSL, he turned to a 345º heading intending to intercept
the 292º radial outbound from Baldonnel VOR. After 10-15 seconds,
on this heading, he realised that this heading of 345º would not intercept
the 292º radial outbound. He reported that as he was commencing to
turn on to a westerly heading, the Baldonnel approach control told him
to turn to a westerly heading and to contact Dublin radar on frequency
121.10. He reported seeing the LXR 3361 aircraft 1,000 ft., above and 1.5
nm distance. He said the surface wind at the time was 190º gusting
33 knots and at 2,000 ft. AMSL, winds gusted up to 60 kts from the same
direction. The captain reported, that in his opinion, the momentary heading
deviation combined with the significant tailwind pushed his aircraft to
the fringes of Dublin airspace.
Military
and Civil Area Control
At
11.03 hours Dublin Radar contacted Baldonnel ATC over the dedicated land
line to inform the military controller that LXR 3361, routing from the
south, was being vectored on to Runway 10 at Dublin Airport. Military ATC
informed Dublin Radar that the military aircraft was under procedural control
and that military ATC did not have radar facility at the time. They also
informed them that during the first VOR/DME approach, the aircraft went
out a maximum of 15 miles west in conducting the MAP procedure. Dublin
Radar confirmed that he could see the military aircraft on the radar screen.
Dublin Radar was then informed that the military aircraft would be making
an approach on to Runway 11 at Casement Aerodrome, and then at the missed
approach point making a left turn to intercept 292 radial outbound.
The
Dublin Radar controller confirmed that he would watch the progress of the
military trainer whilst vectoring LXR 3361 on to Runway 10 at Dublin Airport.
At 11.08 hours, the Dublin Radar controller indicated to military ATC that
LXR 3361 was well clear of the military aircraft making its second missed
approach to Runway 11.
Communications
Baldonnel
Tower and Dublin Radar have a facility to communicate point to point, using
a dedicated land line, leased from Telecom Eireann. The communication between
Baldonnel ATC and Dublin Approach Radar is similar, from an ATC controllers
perspective, to inter-sector communication in Dublin ACC.
Meteorological
Conditions
The
meteorological report for Casement Aerodrome, Baldonnel for 7th. November
1998 was as follows:
09.00
hours
Wind
200/13 Max 26 Kt
Visibility
10 Km
Cloud
FEW 2900; SCT 5000; BKN 20,000
Temperature
11ºC; DP 6ºC
10.00
hours
Wind
190/18 Max 29 Kt
Visibility
10 Km
Cloud
FEW 2200; SCT 4300; BKN 20,000
Temperature
11ºC; DP 7ºC
11.00
hours
Wind
190/23 Max 33 Kt
Visibility
10 Km
Cloud
FEW 2600; SCT 9000; OVC 14,000
Temperature
12ºC; DP 5ºC
The
24 hour forecast for winds valid to 1200 hours
Flight
Level 10 Wind 190/40
Flight
Level 50 Wind 190/55
Published
Approach Plates
The
investigator examined three published plates for Runway 11 at Casement
Aerodrome as follows:
(a)
Jeppesen. This chart for a missed approach states:
"Climb
straight aheato VOR, then turn left on 270º to max 1500 ft. When established
West of R-345 continue climb to 2600 ft. Contact ATC."
(b)
Ordnance Survey, (published on behalf of the Air Corps). This chart for
a missed approach states:
"1.5
NM DME climb straight ahead to VOR, then turn left on to 270º to not
above 1500 ft. When established West of Radial 345, continue climb to 2600
ft."
(c)
U.S. Navy, (used by Reno 13). This chart for a missed approach states:
"At
VOR/DME turn left on 270. Climb to but not above 1500 ft. When established
West of BAL R-345, continue climb to 2600 ft contact ATC."
Aircraft
Proximity
Aircraft
proximity is defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation Doc
4444 as:- "A situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or air traffic
services personnel, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative
positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved
may have been compromised.
An
aircraft proximity is classified as follows:
-
Risk
of collision: The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which
serious risk-of-collision has existed.
-
Safety
not assured: The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in
which the safety of an aircraft may have been impaired.
-
No risk
of collision: The risk classification of an aircraft proximity in which
no risk of collision has existed.
-
Risk
not determined: The risk classification of an aircraft proximity
in which insufficient information was available to determine the risk involved,
or conflicting evidence precluded such determination.
VOR/DME
Approach Training
The
normal procedure used at Casement Aerodrome is for the aircraft to establish
overhead at 5,000 ft., turn right on to 175º, and then left on to
292º to descend to 2,600 ft., at the intermediate fix point.
The
aircraft then descends to the missed approach point, 1.5 nm from the DME
on a heading of 112º. On reaching the missed approach point the aircraft
then turns left, not above 1,500 ft, crosses Radial 345 and again climbs
to 2,600 ft., heading 292º.
Because
the military controller was concerned about activity at Weston on this
particular occasion, he considered it wise to allow Reno 13 an extra 500
ft in height. The Captain was advised, therefore, not to fly above 2000
ft in the turn rather than "not above 1500 ft."
Analysis
The
military aircraft, having passed the missed approach point, turned left
as appropriate and climbed to 2,000 ft. The radar trace of the aircraft's
track (see Annex A), indicates that the aircraft did not continue the turn
on to a heading of 270º as required, but stopped turning on a heading
of 345º with the mistaken intention of intercepting the 292º
Radial to Baldonnel VOR. He continued on this heading of 345º and
passed through the Dublin Control Zone boundary at about four miles from
the Baldonnel VOR. The Dublin Approach controller then contacted military
ATC who instructed the military aircraft to turn on to a westerly heading.
By the time the military aircraft turned it was within 1.5 nm of the Luxor
3361 flight and approximately 400 ft below that aircraft.
Considering
the closing speed of 360kts between the military aircraft whilst on a heading
of 345º and the civilian aircraft on the ILS approach, with its vertical
profile set, the risk must be considered to be in the "Risk of Collision"
category.
There
was no radar service being provided by the military ATC at the time either
from Casement Aerodrome or from the military control position at Dublin
Airport. The military control position at Dublin Airport was not manned
at that time. The Dublin controller acted promptly when he noticed the
incursion but, between the time he contacted military ATC by land line
and military ATC requesting Reno13 to turn on a westerly heading 7 seconds
had elapsed. Reno 13, during that time, was closing rapidly on the civilian
aircraft. The military controller had no radar monitor available and, working
in procedural environment, was unaware of the situation.
The
crew of the military aircraft were from a foreign base and were not familiar
with the exacting requirements of the Baldonnel VOR/DME missed approach
procedure in the vicinity of the Dublin Control Zone. Under these circumstances
the execution of a simulated single engine go around with its own restrictions
on aircraft manoeuvrability may have placed too high a workload on the
pilot.
The
three published VOR/DME charts in use have some differences which may be
misinterpreted if adequate briefing before hand does not take place. Specifically,
the USN plate in use by the military crew states:- "At VOR/DME turn left
on 270", (no degree symbol and not prefixed with the word "to"), the Jeppesen
plate states "turn left on 270º", and the Ordnance Survey chart states
"turn left on to 270º". In all three the Radial is expressed as either
Radial 345 or R345. The degree symbol is not used in this case. The use
of the word 'established' on the approach plates used by the crew of Reno
13, may also have led to a misinterpretation of the procedure. The word
"crossing" would be better in this case.
Other
differences between the USN plate used by the military visitors and Ordnance
Survey plates are:
-
(a) The
USN chart is headed VOR RWY 11 and not VOR/DME RWY 11 as would be normal
when conducting VOR/DME missed approach training.
-
(b) The
USN chart does not show the Dublin Control Zone boundary nor is adequate
attention drawn to the proximity of Dublin Airport to the airbase. It does
however, have the Radial 345 indicated which is not indicated on the Ordnance
Survey plate.
The Captain
did not carry out the procedure in accordance with the normal VOR/DME approach
training at Casement Aerodrome. On the first run his initial descent was
from 5,000 ft., to the MAP, whereas he should have descended from a height
of 2,600 ft. This caused the military controller to have doubts as to whether
the Captain was aware of the full procedure. The military controller then
read out the instructions over the R/T until the first attempt had been
completed. The controller was confident that the Captain was now aware
of the procedure, so as to be able to carry out a further go round . However,
the subsequent events showed that the Captain was not aware of the approach
procedure contrary to what he had indicated to the controller at the briefing
beforehand.
Conclusions
-
The occurrence
was a Class A aircraft proximity (i.e. a serious risk of collision did
exist).
-
The incident
was due to poor navigation on the part of the military aircraft and the
non compliance with ATC clearance.
-
The deviation
from the correct missed approach procedure was compounded by the crew having
to cope with a simulated engine failure.
-
The captain
was not properly briefed on the procedure by the ATC Controller because
he indicated to the controller that he was familiar with such procedure.
-
The USN
VOR RWY 11 plate used by the captain of Reno 13 did not adequately warn
him of the proximity of the military aerodrome and civil airport.
-
The missed
approach procedures on all available plates were different in their wording
content. The word "established" used in all plates may have lead to some
confusion.
Safety
Recommendations
-
The Standing
Civil/Military Air Navigation Co-Ordination Commitee (STACMAN) should amend
their procedures to include a notification of the level of Air Traffic
Services available at Casement Aerodrome and Dublin Airport when military
activity is taking place. (SR 39 of 1999)
-
The Standing
Civil/Military Air Navigation Co-Ordination Commitee (STACMAN) should study
the implications of simultaneous operations on to Runway 11 at the military
aerodrome and Runway 10 at Dublin Airport. (SR 40 of 1999)
-
The Standing
Civil/Military Air Navigation Co-Ordination Commitee (STACMAN) should re-evaluate
the procedures for civil traffic under VFR routing to Weston Aerodrome.
(SR 41 of 1999)
-
The Standing
Civil/Military Air Navigation Co-Ordination Commitee (STACMAN) should examine
the appropriateness of the missed approach procedure used on Runway 11,
at Casement Aerodrome, which brings Casement traffic close to the traffic
approaching Runway 10, at Dublin Airport, on a converging track. (SR 42
of 1999)
-
The Department
of Defence should provide a Distance to Touchdown Indicator or Aerodrome
Traffic Monitor (ATM) to the controller at Casement Aerodrome. (SR 43 of
1999)
-
The Department
of Defence should consider the re-wording of the missed approach procedure
used on to Runway 11 at Casement aerodrome and to substitute the word "establish"
with the word "crossing". Procedural instructions should be more precise
and less open to interpretation. (SR 44 of 1999).
-
The Air
Corps should appoint a liaison officer who should ensure that all visiting
flight crews are in possession of plates or charts which are in agreement
with those issued to locally flying personnel. (SR 45 of 1999)
-
Flight
personnel using military airspace for any reason should ensure that they
are in possession of plates or charts which are in agreement with those
issued to local aircrew. (SR 46 of 1999)
Note:
The Department of Defence have purchased an Aerodrome Traffic Monitor (ATM)
which is about to be installed at Casement Aerodrome. This is slaved to
the Dublin Radar and will be helpful as an aid to the controller at Casement
Aerodrome. |